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abstract:  Mid-2013, estimates of Bahrain’s population stood at 1,253,191 persons, of whom 638,361 
(51 per cent) were foreign nationals. Most were from Asia (85 per cent) and especially from India (half of 
all foreign residents). Eighty per cent of expatriates are employed. They account for 77 per cent of the em-
ployed population and 81 per cent of the private sector’s workforce. Asians are overwhelmingly involved 
in services and “blue collar” occupations, while Arabs more often fill managerial posts. Immigration flows 
to the Kingdom increased significantly over the 2000s, fuelled by high oil prices and the ensuing boom 
in the construction and services sectors. This demonstrates the difficulty to reconcile labour reforms, and 
especially, the Bahrainisation of the work force, with the maximisation of economic productivity. 
Keywords:  Bahrain, Politics, Policy, Sponsorship, Foreign & National Populations, Foreign Population, 
Labour Market, National & Foreign Labour, Naturalisation.
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Introduction 
T he first discovery of oil in the Arab Peninsula took place in Bahrain, in 1932. Previous seasonal migration linked to pearl exploitation was rapidly replaced by inflows of workers from Western countries, Iran, British India, and other Gulf States such as Oman. In spite of such a long history 
of labour migration to the country, foreign residents did not outnumber Bahraini citizens until the end 
of the 2000s. By then, oil reserves had considerably reduced and the Kingdom was one of the three least 
wealthy GCC countries.1  
From the start of Bahrain’s oil exploitation, migration flows of workers to the country took on par-
ticular political stakes. Unemployed Bahraini nationals were to be hired in priority for vacant posts in 
the nascent oil industry;2 but their lack of experience in the field enticed Bahrain Petroleum Company 
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(BAPCO) to resort instead to employing skilled and cheap Iranian labourers.3 However, for fear that 
these labour migration patterns would encourage Iran’s claims over Bahrain, the British Protectorate 
authorities and Bahrain’s ruling family Al-Khalifa supported the recruitment of Indian skilled and semi-
skilled professionals. An economic rationale thus confronted political concerns in the management of 
foreign labour.4 Additionally, Bahraini workers who were filling the lowest paid position at the bottom 
of the occupational ladder5 launched labour protests as early as 1938 and 1954-56. They also formed la-
bour unions, excluding from it the foreign labourers who were viewed as “adjuncts of the Western powers 
at work in the country”.6 From the first population census conducted in 1941 to Bahrain’s independence 
in 1971, the share of non-nationals remained constant at around 20 per cent.
From the mid-1970s and the oil-boom to the early 2000s, the numbers of foreign nationals surged 
to a third of the total population. Arab labourers were progressively replaced by Asians, and semi-skilled 
and skilled expatriates from earlier waves (among who were many Indians) were outnumbered by low-
skilled, manual workers. The fragmentation of the workforce also increased with the segmentation of 
the labour market between a Bahraini-(over)staffed governmental sector – including industrial joint 
ventures such as BAPCO and ALBA, the aluminium company– and a private sector employing foreign 
workers in detrimental conditions. The oil slump of the 1980s and 1990s and the ensuing contraction of 
the public sector led to mounting levels of unemployment among young Bahrainis. 
In such a dire situation and also due to its limited oil resources, Bahrain decided to embark on 
a strong and fast economic liberalisation process. Its economy diversified and expanded into banking 
and finance, heavy industries and manufacturing, retail, and tourism. Fuelled by the hike in oil prices 
after 2003, development policies followed “a blueprint that envisions Bahrain as the progressive hub of 
ﬁnance and service industries in the Gulf, a beacon of modernity in the region, and a tourist attraction 
constructed around the city as a site of consumption.”7 “Mega-real estate projects” directed at expatri-
ates,8 especially, contributed to the construction boom in the country. 
Such economic achievements were also facilitated by increasing flows of foreign workers. The dec-
ade witnessed a doubling of the total resident population in the Kingdom and almost a trebling of the 
number of foreign residents. This seems in contradiction with the major reform of Bahrain’s labour mar-
ket launched in 2004, which aimed at alleviating nationals’ massive unemployment. The policy was based 
on erasing the segmentation of labour between nationals and expatriates by fully liberalising the labour 
market and on curbing immigration by equalizing the cost of employing nationals and expatriates. The 
Labour Market Regulation Authority (LMRA) was established in May 2006 and mandated with regu-
lating and controlling work permits for expatriate employees and the self-employed, in addition to is-
suing licenses for the workforce and recruitment agencies. In order to enforce real competition between 
nationals and expatriates and thus improve work conditions and wages in the private sector, Bahrain 
loosened the kafala (sponsorship) system in August 2009 by abolishing the mandatory No Objection 
Certificate hampering expatriates’ professional mobility. However, employers opposed this modest move, 
and since mid-2009, a new law9 restricts the switching of kafeel (sponsor) without the latter’s consent to 
those having spent one full year with their sponsor.10 In Bahrain, like elsewhere in the Gulf, reform of 
the management of foreign labour is the subject of significant domestic political tensions.
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As a matter of fact, the “natives” vs “foreigners” and migration issues have other political implica-
tions in the country. Ever since the time of the British rule, foreigners were hired in the army and police 
in order to avoid risks of collusion with locals.11 However, one of the demands of the demonstrators 
since the start of the uprisings in February 2011 has been to put an end to naturalisation that would 
impact the communal makeup of the Bahraini population.   
Inward Migration
Stocks
Figure 1: Bahrainis and non-Bahrainis in total resident population
(mid-year estimates, 1995-2013)
Mid-2014, estimates of Bahrain’s population stood at 1,314,562 persons, of whom 638,818 (52 per 
cent) were foreign nationals.12 The number of foreign residents rose rapidly during the 2000s and non-
nationals accounted for up to 54 per cent of the total population in 2010. Since then, however, a slight 
decrease in the numbers of non-Bahrainis may be noted.  In mid-2013, 509,622 persons or 79.8 per cent 
of the foreign residents were employed,13 making up 77 per cent of the total employed population in 
the Kingdom. Unlike in other GCC states, Bahraini nationals are mostly enrolled in the private sector 
(63 per cent of the employed Bahraini population as of mid-2013). Most of the foreign labourers are 
also employed in the private as well as in the domestic sectors: respectively, 78.5 and 20 per cent of the 
non-Bahraini employed population. The latter accounted for 81 per cent of the private sector’s workforce 
that year.14  
The profile of the foreign population is that of a predominantly male (79.3 per cent, or 385 men 
for 100 women), little educated (82.5 per cent of the total as well as employed foreign populations have 
below secondary level education)15 and relatively young population (mean age is 32.6 years),16 distorted 
in its age structure: those in the working age group (15-64 years age group) formed 90 per cent of all 
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non-nationals in 2010.17 As regards their activity, the bulk of foreign labourers worked in the construc-
tion sector (27.9 per cent), in wholesale and retail trade (16.3 per cent), in the private household sector 
(16 per cent), and in manufacturing (12.4 per cent). Bahrainis, by contrast, were employed in the public 
administration and defence sector (31 per cent of them, and 35 per cent of men alone). However, a size-
able share of nationals also worked in wholesale and trade (13.2 per cent) and in manufacturing (10.8 
per cent).18 Like elsewhere in the Gulf States, the overwhelming majority of foreign nationals were from 
Asia (84.4 per cent in 2010).19 Asians also made up as much as 90 per cent of foreign workers that year; 
by comparison, Arabs accounted for a mere 4.5 per cent of the workforce. Among Asian nationalities, as 
of September 2014, Indian nationals alone made up a half of all resident expatriates (49.4 per cent), and 
47.7 per cent of foreign workers.20  
table 1: Bahrain’s foreign resident population by main countries of origin,  
migration status and sex ratio (2014)
  The foreign resident population in Bahrain displays great demographic and socio-economic di-
versity. Asian populations (Bangladeshis especially) are mostly made up of workers, while Arab popula-
tions (with the exception of Yemenis) comprise mainly family dependents. Expectedly, the sex ratio in 
Arab populations is less imbalanced than among Asians. Filipinos are the only national group made up 
of a majority of women, probably due to the high share of these nationals employed as female domestic 
workers in the GCC region. 
Country
of cizenship Number % Worker
India 257,663 49.4 76.7 23.3 411
Bangladesh 98,221 18.8 96.5 3.5 3,551
Pakistan 48,991 9.4 81.0 19.0 619
Philippines 29,722 5.7 88.9 11.1 77
Sri Lanka 7,627 1.5 78.1 21.9 136
Egypt 19,580 3.8 43.6 56.4 136
Jordan 7,235 1.4 41.5 58.5 138
Yemen 4,723 0.9 54.3 45.7 249
Syria 2,944 0.6 48.3 51.7 176
U.K. 3,927 0.8 57.9 42.1 143
Other countries 40,917 7.8 77.7 22.3 231
Total 521,550 100 79.4 20.6 385
Total expatriates Sex rao
(men/100
women)  
Family 
member
Migraon status
Source: LMRA Expat Management System (EMS), September-October 2014.
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Figure 2: Employed non-Bahrainis by occupation and
nationality groups (arabs, asians, total) (2010)
Like in other Gulf countries, the income level (a minimum of 250 Bahraini Dinars21 monthly) of 
the (male) expatriate conditions his right to sponsor family members for residency in Bahrain.22 Foreign 
workers in general and Asian workers in particular are most often confined to services and “blue collar” 
occupations (80 per cent of them as of 2010), and thus unlikely to meet the required conditions. Arab 
expatriates, by contrast, display more diversity in their occupations: 40 per cent of them were in manual 
low-skilled sectors but almost a half of these workers were in managerial and higher technical occupa-
tions, as opposed to 13 per cent of Asians only. 
Flows
As emphasized earlier, Bahrain’s national and non-national resident populations both rose notably dur-
ing the 2000s. As of the late 1990s, the demographic growth rates in Bahrain had remained relatively 
constant at around 2.4 per cent annually for several years. Yet, between 2000 and 2009, a marked increase 
in nationals’ growth rates (from 2.4 to 4.2 per cent annually) can be noticed. 
The registration of vital events in Bahrain is considered excellent by international standards 23 and 
the country publishes vital statistics disaggregated by nationality. This allows for drawing a simulation 
scenario of the growth of the Bahraini population, had it been based on natural increase (births minus 
deaths) only. As indicated in Fig. 3, the actual, observed size of the Bahraini population starts rising 
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much faster than the simulated national population (that growing through natural increase only) after 
2001. An estimate of the unexplained “surplus” within Bahraini population as of 2013 is therefore:
B. pop. (2013) - B. pop. (2000) - [(sum of B. births (2000-2013) – sum of B. deaths (2000-2013)] 
= 69,667
If we introduce in the calculation the other component of the population increase, the Bahraini 
citizens’ migration movements during the period 2001-2012,24 the “surplus” expands:
B. pop. (2013) - B. pop. (2000) - [(sum of B. births (2000-2013) – sum of B. deaths (2000-2013)]-
[sum of B. arrivals (2001-2012)-sum of B. departures (2001-2012)] = 95,743
This “surplus” of Bahraini nationals, in the range of 70,000 to 96,000 persons in 2012-2013, thus 
represents between 11 and 16 per cent of the Bahraini citizens recorded that year. 25 Part of these persons 
are probably naturalised foreign nationals.26  
Figure 3: The possible effect of naturalisations on the growth of the 
Bahraini national population (1995-2013)
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Figure 4: Flows of foreign workers to Bahrain (2002-2014)
As regards foreign workers, during the 2000s, the number of those granted regular work visas alone 
(new and renewed) more than doubled, from 104,000 in 2002 to 236,000 in 2012.27 The number of work 
visa terminations also went up, however, from 60,000 in 2009 to around 88,500 in 2013. However, in 
spite of some moderate variations from one year to the next in the number of visas delivered, the general 
trend remains upward.
Figure 5: Distribution of visas by economic activity sector (2010-2014)
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The booming development of certain economic sectors, such as construction, in the Kingdom has 
been steadily attracting and retaining foreign workers as witnessed in the distribution of visas28 by eco-
nomic activity sector. Most visas are granted to expatriates bound for the construction sector. During the 
third quarter of 2014, the sector actually recorded a rate of growth of more than 12 per cent.29 The retail 
trade sector, too, has been a magnet for flows of foreign workers, in line with the Kingdom’s consump-
tion- and service-oriented economy as noted earlier. These indicators reflect the continued reliance of 
Bahrain’s economy on large numbers of low wage expatriate workers in such labour-intensive sectors as 
manufacturing, retail trade, and construction. 
 This is also confirmed by the moderate, but steady increase in the inflows of foreign residents as 
a whole over the last five years as evident from permits issued: from 337,187 permits (visas) in 2009 
to 361,016 in 2013, including domestic workers. The relative distribution between the main categories 
(dependent, regular worker, temporary worker,30 and domestic worker), however, remains similar across 
recent years. Although data on permits granted by occupation sector are missing to confirm such an as-
sertion, this suggests that no qualitative change in the skill profile of foreign labourers in Bahrain is likely 
in the near future. As noted earlier, the share of family dependents within expatriate populations is an 
indication of the skill and occupation profile of the foreign workers: the higher the latter, the more likely 
they are to be financially able to sponsor their next-of-kin for family reunion in the Gulf. 
Figure 6: Flows of foreign residents by type of visa granted (2009-2014)
The data thus do not point at obvious, marked changes in the patterns of foreign workers’ recruit-
ment, either due to the financial crisis of 2008 or to the onset of the political unrest in the Kingdom 
since 2011. This appears surprising in view of the slowdown in economic growth entailed by these events.
As pointed out by Birks, Seccombe, and Sinclair (1986: 810) in a study on Kuwait, a drop in new 
work permits issued rapidly followed cuts in government expenditures in the early 1980s, while renewals 
10
15.6% 18.1%
66.8%
65.8%
15.4%
14.8%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*N
um
be
r o
f v
is
as
 (i
n 
th
ou
sa
nd
s)
Dependent Employment Investor
Temporary worker Domesc worker
Source: EMS, LMRA and MoL.
* Values for Q4 of 2014 are extrapolated from Q1 to Q3  figures. Visa figures are the sum of new 
and renewed visas for the year.
Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain
Explanatory Note No. 6/2015 11
of permits simultaneously increased. This suggested that foreign labourers were kept in reserve until eco-
nomic recovery, a strategy of “labour-hoarding” used by employers at the time of economic difficulties. 
Such a sequence of events was indeed witnessed in 2009-2010 (Fig. 4), as renewals of permits almost 
doubled from 68,000 to 126,000 and started outnumbering the new permits delivered. Such a scenario 
also may point to the longer settlement of some foreign residents in Bahrain.
Figure 7: Net migration flows to Bahrain  (selected countries of origin, 2000-2012) 
 More generally, however, the upward trend in the total number of visas, new and renewed, granted 
to all categories of foreign residents seems to be contradictory to the decrease in the total number of 
expatriates observed earlier. The terminations of visas went up after 2012 as we have noticed. Neverthe-
less, the several campaigns organised by LMRA since its inception, aiming to regularise or facilitate the 
exit of foreign workers in irregular situation, may also have enticed some expatriates to leave Bahrain. 
In 2010, for instance, LMRA officials claimed they were planning to send home or legalise more than 
40,000 irregular workers by the end of the year. 31 Indeed, the global net migration flows (inward minus 
outward movements of persons across Bahrain’s borders)32 went down notably over the period 2009-
2011. Among some national communities such as the Indians, as well as among nationals from African 
countries, more exits than entries were actually recorded in 2010. This suggests that some expulsions of 
irregulars did take place. 
As for the sustained levels of permits’ delivery, they may, to a certain extent, stem from the regu-
larisation of undocumented workers. Fighting irregularity and enhancing governmental control over the 
labour market has become a concern in Bahrain like elsewhere in the GCC countries.
Yet, it should be noted that Bahrain’s labour market reform measures did not succeed in enhancing 
the professional mobility of foreign workers as was initially planned for by the government and LMRA. 
Most recent data indicate that 10,647 (about 11 per cent) of the 97,059 labour visas delivered during 
Source: Ministry of Interior.
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the third quarter of 2014 resulted from a transfer of visa. However, in spite of the abolition of the No 
Objection Certificate, which prior to 2009 would prevent foreign workers from switching kafeel (spon-
sor) without the latter’s permission, only 1.2 per cent of these transfers of sponsorship actually happened 
without the employer’s consent.33 
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Defence sector) as well as domestic workers (until September 2014) in particular are excluded from LMRA 
files emanating from GOSI (private sector), PFC (public sector), or the EMS (Expat Management System). 
19. Census data, http://gulfmigration.eu/population-by-nationality-group-and-sex-2010/
20. Quarterly data taken from the expatriate management system of LMRA, http://blmi.lmra.bh/mi_glossary.
xml#LMRA%20Expatriate%20Management%20System%20(EMS). The figures include domestic workers, 
but exclude work visas for artists and certain other categories of workers in non-civilian organisations (Armed 
Forces, for instance).
21. $665 or 580 Euros as of December 2014.
22. Articles 2 & 3, Decision No. 121/2007. See M. Zahra, http://gulfmigration.eu/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_
EN_2015_01.pdf. 
23. As stated in an assessment of Bahrain’s Civil Registration and Vital Statistics System by the UN: “The most 
recent quality assessment was in 2006 and the completeness for the registration of all five vital events was 
found to be close to 100%” (U.N. Technical Report on the Status of Civil Registration and Vital Statistics 
in ESCWA Region, United Nations, ESA/STAT/2009/9, p. 4 [§15]) http://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/
Attachment26.aspx.
24. The data on arrivals and departures by citizenship are available only for this period.
25. Population estimates and vital statistics (births, deaths) disaggregated by nationality are published on CIO’s 
website (“Statistics”, then “Population” or “Vital statistics-Births, deaths” http://www.cio.gov.bh/CIO_ENG/
Stats_SubDetailed.aspx?subcatid=604).
B. pop. 
observed 
(mid-year)
B. births 
(mid-year)*
B. deaths 
(mid-year)*
B. pop. 
based on 
natural 
increase 
(mid-year)
B. arrivals 
(mid-year)*
B. 
departures 
(mid-year)*
B. pop. 
based on 
natural 
increase + 
migraon 
(mid-year)
Populaon 
growth rate
(1) (2) (3)
1994 344,479
1995 352,900 10,384 1,477 353,387** n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.42
1996 361,530 10,347 1,521 362,213 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.42
1997 370,377 10,566 1,473 371,306 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.42
1998 379,435 10,810 1,565 380,550 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.42
1999 388,714 11,039 1,601 389,988 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.42
2000 398,221 11,113 1,565 399,536 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.42
2001 409,623 10,700 1,583 408,652 1,220,900 1,216,638 412,914 2.82
2002 427,245 10,491 1,633 417,510 1,307,439 1,299,409 425,540 4.21
2003 445,631 10,929 1,705 426,734 1,406,016 1,400,162 432,589 4.21
2004 464,807 11,512 1,770 436,476 1,548,277 1,544,400 440,354 4.21
2005 484,811 11,846 1,804 446,519 1,722,822 1,723,369 445,972 4.21
2006 505,671 11,847 1,805 456,561 1,885,442 1,895,642 446,360 4.21
2007 527,434 11,986 1,790 466,757 2,024,222 2,025,865 465,114 4.21
2008 541,587 12,601 1,840 477,518 2,269,846 2,266,136 481,228 2.65
2009 558,011 13,213 1,897 488,834 2,438,324 2,445,862 481,296 2.99
2010 570,687 13,543 1,899 500,478 2,219,851 2,227,199 493,130 2.25
2011 584,688 13,518 1,993 512,003 1,124,010 1,133,531 502,481 2.42
2012 599,629 14,087 2,068 524,022 1,531,073 1,546,085 509,010 2.52
2013 614,830 14,940 2,032 536,930 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.50
Source of data : births, deaths, arrivals, departures and populaon figures (col. (1)) for Bahraini
naonals published by CIO. 
Populaon figures in columns (2) and (3) are author’s calculaons, based on CIO published data.
* Published figures were end-of-the-year figures. 
** Pop (2) (1995) = pop (1) (1994)+births (1995)-deaths (1995)
Mid-year figures for year n  were obtained the following way: [x (year n ) + x (year n - 1)] / 2.   
Bahraini populaon and factors of demographic growth (1995-2013)
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26. This hike in population growth rates during the period could also be due to the following fact: between 2001 
(the year of census) and 2007 (the year the Central Population Register [CPR] became operational), popula-
tion could only be estimated. In such a case, a share of the population increase would come from the inclusion 
of unregistered citizens into the CPR throughout the period.
27. Figures of labour permits/visas are taken from the Ministry of Labour records (2002-2007) and from the 
Expatriate Management System of LMRA (2008-2014). 
28. Includes all categories of visas processed by the Expat Management System (EMS) of the LMRA: family 
dependents, temporary, business, and regular workers. Until September 2014, the EMS system excluded do-
mestic workers from its scope and they were placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour. Since 
September 2014, the processing of documents for domestic workers has been incorporated within LMRA’s 
assignments. 
29. This was after suffering a slowdown following the 2008 global economic recession and the 2011 political 
crisis.
30. Temporary worker: a worker engaged to work in an enterprise for a short period, i.e., for less than two years 
and usually six months (Expatriate Management System [EMS] glossary). 
31. http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=279526.
32. As recorded by the Ministry of Interior at border crossings and published in Statistical Yearbooks under the 
“Arrivals and Departures” section. 
33. LMRA. Bahrain Labour Market Indicators, Issue 27, Third quarter, 2014 http://lmra.bh/portal/files/cms/
shared/file/Newsletter/NewsletterQ3(En).pdf. The low turnover of expatriate workers, and especially without 
the sponsor’s consent, was also pointed out by Steffen Hertog (2014: 13).  
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publication reference : Citations and quotations should always include either the long or the short 
reference provided here. Generally the long reference should be used but in exceptional cases (e.g., not 
enough room), the short reference may be used.
Long reference: Françoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain,” 
Explanatory Note No. 6/2015, Gulf Labour Market and Migration (GLMM) programme of the Migra-
tion Policy Center (MPC) and the Gulf Research Center (GRC), http:// gulfmigration.eu
Short reference: F. De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain,” Ex-
planatory Note No. 6/2015, GLMM, http://gulfmigration.eu
GLMM Mission : The Gulf Labour Markets and Migration programme is an international independ-
ent, non-partisan, non-profit joint programme of a major Gulf think tank, the Gulf Research Cent-
er (GRC - Jeddah, Geneva, Cambridge, Tokyo), and a globally renowned academic migration centre, 
the Migration Policy Centre (MPC - Florence). The GLMM programme provides data, analyses, and 
recommendations contributing to the improvement of understanding and management of Gulf labour 
markets and migration, engaging with and respecting the viewpoints of all stakeholders.
GLMM activities : The Gulf Labour Markets and Migration programme will have a wide range of 
activities, including: Collecting and elaborating data and documents; Researching and analysing key is-
sues; Publishing various types of papers; Providing a daily news service; Training; and Organising panels 
and workshops.
GLMM publications : The Gulf Labour Markets and Migration programme produces an array of 
publications addressing all major issues in different formats. Initially, it focuses on Facts Sheets, Explana-
tory Notes and Conference Papers. Subsequently, it will add Research Papers, Policy Briefs, Academic 
Publications as well as Proceedings & Reports.
Downloading  and  Further  Information  : The paper can be downloaded from the Gulf Labour Markets 
and Migration programme website: www.gulfmigration.eu. For further information: info.glmm@grc.net
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